Introduction

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that happiness is a state of living that meets all human needs, an “absolute ultimate goal” of all other aims, and is always valued for the good in itself. He further argues that the true happiness, as the ultimate good among humans, lies in the lifelong exercise of the virtues of the soul. This raises a key question: how is happiness developed through actions and exercises? This essay argues that the development of happiness will be structured in a two-part framework: habituation as the foundation, and wisdom as the completion and perfection. While practicing good habits provides the necessary groundwork for happiness, the sole dependence on habituation is insufficient to achieve the highest good. Wisdom is required to integrate with habits to attain the full expression of virtuous activities, which is the good life itself.

The essay is structured into three main sections. First, we will provide a clear definition of happiness, a good life, and virtues, as well as their internal linkage in Aristotle’s philosophy. Next, we will examine the role and limitations of habits. Finally, we will analyze how wisdom perfects the habits, and how such perfection leads to a complete good life.

Happiness, Good Life and Virtue in Aristotle’s Ethics

The idea of happiness, good life and virtue are different aspects that serve the same ultimate aim for all human beings in Aristotle’s ethical system. Happiness is the feeling of pleasure in itself; it’s “in the soul and not an external thing.” A good life means a state of being that expresses happiness. For happiness to be the highest good, living a good life is equivalent to living a happy life.

Such goodness, according to Aristotle, lies in a central task for all human beings: “the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue,” referred to as the Function Argument. And because what distinguishes the human function from other creatures is the ability to think rationally, it implies that human virtue is the capability to act from reason. This reveals the intrinsic link between these three important concepts. A good life is the most complete form of life that expresses happiness, which can only be achieved through acting rationally in accordance with virtue.

Habits as the Foundation

In Aristotle’s framework, virtues are divided into two categories: intellectual and character. Intellectual virtues can be taught directly, and they will be further discussed in the section on wisdom. Character (moral) virtues, on the other hand, are acquired through habits. Aristotle used an analogy to account for the role of habituation: a stone cannot be habituated to fly upwards when falling by the nature of gravity; if moral virtues arise by nature, we reach a contradiction that vices are non-existent because virtues cannot be trained into different forms of beings. Therefore, character virtues are the consequence of habituation.

The process of attaining a virtue requires one to habituate the virtue. Aristotle claims that any character traits can only be acquired through habituating actions associated with such a type. This is analogous to a guitar musician who achieves excellence in guitar playing through the habits of playing the guitar, or any technical skills in general. However, Aristotle also realizes that habits can lead to a good character trait if the behavior is formulated in the right direction, or otherwise become a vice, just like that guitar player cannot become an expert if chords are practiced on a violin. Thus, manifesting the right action is the key.

Aristotle addresses this with the “golden mean,” which states that every moral virtue is an intermediate between an excessive state and a deficiency state. Therefore, the virtue (of character), in nature, is the disposition of choosing a middle point between one extreme and another. For example, courage, as one of the moral virtues, reflects the choice one makes between cowardice and recklessness when facing fear. During battles, cowardly soldiers lack courage, so they shrink from all danger; reckless soldiers have too much courage, so they run into every dangerous situation. The courageous ones, on the other hand, possess the appropriate amount of fear and confidence so that they are capable of challenging difficult situations, and know when to retreat from excessive danger. And we further claim that habits have an important role in finding the “golden mean.” For a soldier with courage, one must repeatedly exercise the habits of courage in wars, that is, to evaluate the right decision to advance and retreat under danger. Sometimes the decision may lean towards cowardice or recklessness, but with reasoning (and getting out of the battle alive), the soldier is able to learn from this mistake, and takes a slight step closer to the “golden mean” of a moral virtue.

According to Aristotle, a good person must enjoy and gain pleasure from the superior good. Through the habits of exercising goodness, one can align one’s desire and emotion with the good, and refrain from falling into the vice. In Aristotle’s ethics, being good is tremendously difficult, so that the practitioner may experience negative emotion in real-life activities. In this case, if one does not have a virtuous habit, one may deviate into more instinctive or unstable desires. Consistent habits enable the practitioner to adjust their expectations and emotions, which continuously align with virtuous activities. Over time, the good action becomes natural, and the practitioner will eventually genuinely enjoy and desire to do the right thing. Meanwhile, these habits keep the practitioner from vicious activities. For example, people who exercise honesty do not lie; people who exercise integrity do not steal; people who exercise modesty are not prideful; otherwise, they cannot be attributed as practitioners of any of these virtues.

One objection accuses habituation of its mechanical, mindless and “horse-training like” process of training and exercising. Hursthouse provided a defense for habituation, referring to Aristotle’s claim of the soul and rationality: the soul is divided into the plant-like part that is merely irrational, and the desire that shares some reason, which can be compliant with rationality. This enables us to practice feeling the specific emotion when it should arise, that is, “towards the right people, for the right reason and in the right way.” In the harmony of emotion, desires, and reason, habituation maximizes human nature to receive virtues, rather than a mindless repetition.

However, according to Aristotle, habituation can only cultivate the part of character virtues perceived by human nature. A person who acts purely from habits, without the wisdom to deeply understand the underlying virtues, may still act viciously because of the limited reasoning faculty. Therefore, the experience and virtuous principles that one acquires through habituation are inadequate for more complicated situations. For example, when facing a moral dilemma such as whether to tell a small lie to protect someone, or to be honest and put oneself in danger, the exercise of honesty provides little guidance under these circumstances. If greater harm is caused because the practitioner insists on honesty, then it is at least controversial that such habituation of honesty is virtuous.

Based on the previous discussion, we have established multiple claims to support the significance of habits. First, character virtues are the consequence of habituation. Second, character traits can only be acquired through habituating actions associated with such a type. Third, habits have an important role in finding the “golden mean,” which is the virtue of character. Lastly, habits align one’s desire and emotion with the good and refrain from vice. Therefore, happiness, as the realization of virtues, cannot exist without the significant role of habits in character virtues. Hence, habits are the foundation of a good life. However, without the wisdom to account for intellectual virtues, habits are not implied by having a good life.

Wisdom as the Perfection

Aristotle claims that the development of ethical virtue consists of two stages: habituation during childhood, and practical wisdom when the reasoning faculty is mature. Such a timely order provides evidence that habituation serves as the archetype, and wisdom shapes it to fit the actual complexities and difficulties encountered during virtuous development in reality. While habits cultivate only part of the character traits inherent in human nature, wisdom, on the other hand, contributes to the full moral goodness. Furthermore, Aristotle claims that one cannot be fully good without wisdom, nor could one be wise without having virtuous character. So, wisdom and moral virtues are closely related and inseparable on the path to goodness, with the virtues providing the right goal, and wisdom determining the right means. This clarifies the roles between habits and wisdom, and how one interacts with another: habits enable one to develop character virtues to a certain degree that aligns with human nature; these virtues reveal the right goals that aim for the ultimate happiness; wisdom analyzes the situation with reason and figures out the optimal strategy to pursue. This is how wisdom completes the path to happiness and makes a good life in the full sense.

Conclusion

To conclude, Aristotle presents that the development of a good life is a two-stage process. The path to happiness starts with the foundational work of habits. Through the consistent exercise of virtuous activities, we shape our character traits, train our emotions and desires to align with the moral virtues, and explore our unique “golden mean.” This process builds up a well-formed moral character that provides us with the right goal of happiness. Our character then must be guided and perfected by wisdom through our reasoning faculty. This intellectual virtue enables us to make the right decisions towards achieving a complete good life.